Trust
Security and sanctions screening
What Toreador checks, when, against which lists, what happens when a check is impossible, and what Toreador cannot do. Written from the code that runs, not from intentions.
What we cannot do
Toreador is non-custodial software. A payment goes from the payer's wallet to the merchant's wallet on a public blockchain; nothing passes through us. We can refuse to create a QR code or a payment page, and we can flag what we observe, but we cannot block, hold, freeze or reverse a transaction once it is broadcast. We screen sanctions lists; we do not operate a scam or phishing database.
Sanctions screening: sources by network
| Networks | Lists consulted |
|---|---|
| Ethereum, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum, Avalanche, BNB Chain | Lists downloaded by us (United States (OFAC), European Union, United Kingdom, Switzerland (SECO)) + Chainalysis sanctions oracle (OFAC, EU, UN) |
| Bitcoin | Lists downloaded by us (United States (OFAC), European Union, United Kingdom, Switzerland (SECO)) |
| Solana | Lists downloaded by us (United States (OFAC), European Union, United Kingdom, Switzerland (SECO)) |
| List | Downloaded from | Crypto addresses | Names |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States (OFAC) · Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list | www.treasury.gov | Yes | Yes |
| European Union · Consolidated list of financial sanctions | webgate.ec.europa.eu | Yes | Yes |
| United Kingdom · UK Sanctions List | sanctionslist.fcdo.gov.uk | Yes | Yes |
| Switzerland (SECO) · Sanctions list (full) | www.sesam.search.admin.ch | Yes | Yes |
| United Nations Security Council · Consolidated list | scsanctions.un.org | No | Yes |
We also compare the names of merchants (organization name, legal name, certified legal name, account holder) with the names published in the lists marked “Names” above. A match never blocks anything automatically: it raises an internal alert that a person reviews. The comparison is literal after normalization (case, accents, punctuation, legal forms); it does not transliterate between alphabets and is not a guarantee that a merchant is, or is not, a listed person.
- The OFAC SDN list is downloaded from www.treasury.gov several times a day (with a public mirror as fallback) and kept on our servers; addresses are compared locally, nothing is sent to a third party for this.
- The lists of the European Union, the United Kingdom and Switzerland are downloaded from their official sites every day and kept on our servers. They give crypto addresses inside free text, not in a dedicated field: we extract them by pattern and keep only those that are valid addresses on the networks we support. The United Nations list publishes no crypto address.
- For EVM addresses, we also query the Chainalysis sanctions oracle, a public smart contract on Ethereum that aggregates OFAC, EU and UN designations. Only the address is sent, through our blockchain node provider; it is public data.
- Bitcoin and Solana addresses are checked against the downloaded lists only. If our copy of the OFAC list is older than 48 hours, we no longer affirm that such an address is clear.
- A verdict is kept 24 hours; an address used again after that is screened again.
When we screen, and what happens
| Moment | Address on a list | Check impossible |
|---|---|---|
| A merchant registers a receiving address | Refused | Refused |
| A QR code or payment page is created (web generator, API, MCP) | Refused recipient_blocked | Allowed, logged |
| A payer connects their wallet on a checkout page | Refused address_blocked | Allowed, logged |
| A transfer is detected on-chain after the fact | Flagged | — |
- “Check impossible” means the address is invalid, our list copy is stale, or the oracle does not answer. Registering a receiving address is then refused (try again later); a QR code or a payment in progress is not blocked, so that a legitimate payment never fails because of us, and the case is logged.
- “Flagged” means the payment is marked in the merchant's records and reported to the merchant, who remains responsible for their own legal obligations regarding such funds. The payment itself is already on-chain.
- Screening is a best-effort check against public lists. It is not legal advice and not a guarantee that a transaction is lawful.
Stablecoins frozen by their issuer
The issuer of a stablecoin can freeze an address inside the stablecoin's own contract. Depending on the contract, a transfer to a frozen address is refused, or it arrives and can never be moved again. This is not a sanctions list: an issuer also freezes on a court order or at the request of an authority. We read this state directly on the blockchain; only the address is sent, through our blockchain node provider.
| Stablecoin | Networks checked | Networks not readable |
|---|---|---|
| USDC · Circle | Ethereum, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum, Avalanche | BNB Chain |
| EURC · Circle | Ethereum, Base, Avalanche | — |
| USDT · Tether | Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Avalanche | Base, BNB Chain |
| USAT · Tether | Ethereum | — |
| PYUSD · Paxos | Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon | — |
| USDG · Paxos | Ethereum, Arbitrum | — |
| OUSD · Bridge | Ethereum | Base |
| RLUSD | — | Ethereum, Base |
- When a merchant registers or restores a receiving address, every readable stablecoin and network is checked. An address frozen by an issuer is refused.
wallet_frozen_by_issuer - When a payment is created, the stablecoin and the network of that payment are checked. No payment page is created for a frozen address (API: no_rail), and a payment link does not offer that stablecoin on that network.
- A freeze verdict is kept 24 hours. If the blockchain cannot be read, neither the registration nor the payment is blocked, and the case is logged.
- “Not readable” means the contract on that network exposes no freeze state that we can read (bridged versions, for example). These stablecoins are not checked on those networks.
Account and integration security
- Sign-in by passkey; wallets and API keys require a fresh passkey confirmation.
- API keys are shown once and stored as cryptographic hashes. Test keys run on test networks; live keys on mainnet.
- Webhooks are signed (HMAC-SHA256) with a per-endpoint secret; verify the signature before trusting an event.
- Payment pages load no third-party analytics and no session recording.
- A merchant can prove control of a receiving address by signing a dated message with the wallet (EIP-191 on EVM networks, Ed25519 on Solana). The signature authorizes no transaction; payment pages show “ownership proven” for such addresses.
Exchange connections
- Where allowed for your country, a merchant can connect an exchange account to import a deposit address. The API key you provide must be read-only: a key that could withdraw or transfer funds is refused before anything is stored.
- Stored keys are encrypted (AES-256-GCM), bound to your account, and re-verified every day; if the key changes or gains permissions, the wallet is paused.
- Toreador never moves funds on an exchange. It only reads the deposit address and, where the exchange exposes it, the networks and tokens the address accepts.
References
- Terms of Service — article 8 (sanctions compliance and screening)
- Privacy Policy — sections 4 and 9 (processors, security)
- Business verification